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ANDERSON v. COMMISSIONER-TAX STATUS OF
PAYMENTS IN SATISFACTION OF LIABILITY
UNDER SECTION 16(b) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
During 1962 and 1963, James E. Anderson a vice president of Zenith
Radio Corporation purchased 1,000 shares of Zenith common stock, pur-
suant to a company stock option plan, for $14,038.90. In April of 1966
Anderson sold these shares for $162,923.21, resulting in a profit of
$148,884.31. Subsequent to the sale, Anderson repurchased, on April
11, 1966, 750 shares of Zenith common stock, also pursuant to a company
stock option plan.
Advised by Zenith's legal department that the sale and subsequent pur-
chase fell within section 16(b) 1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2
and that Zenith must demand payment of the profit realized on the sale and
purchase, Anderson, in 1966, paid Zenith $51,259.14.3
1. Section 16(b) provides as follows:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by rea-
son of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any
purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of
such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less
than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in con-
nection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable
by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial
owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the
security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period ex-
ceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law
or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the
owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer
if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after
request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no
such su't shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit
was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transac-
tion where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the
purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase of the security involved, or
any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regula-
tions may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsec-
tion.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970).
3. Although normally the liability formula is the sale price less the lowest
purchase price, where, as here, the purchase is made under an option acquired
more than six months prior to its exercise, the amount of liability is calculated by
subtracting from the sales proceeds the lowest market price of any security of the
same class within six months before or after the date of the sale. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16(b)-6(a) and (b) (Supp. 1973). See also Kornfeld v. Eaton, 327 F.2d
263, 265 (2d Cir. 1964).
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In his 1966 tax return, Anderson treated the $148,884.31 profit real-
ized on the sale of the 1,000 shares of Zenith stock as a long-term capital
gain. 4  He also deducted the $51,259.41 he paid to Zenith under section
16(b) as an ordinary and necessary business expense. 5 However, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the payments to Ze-
nith should be treated as long-term capital losses6 rather than as ordinary
losses, resulting in a deficiency in the amount of $21,897.64. However,
the Tax Court made an ultimate finding of fact that the payments to
Zenith were made to preserve Anderson's employment with Zenith and to
avoid injury to his business reputation. It held that the payments were
an ordinary and necessary business expense, deductible under section
162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 7
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the rule of Ar-
rowsmith v. Commissioners applied to require that the payments in sat-
isfaction of section 16(b) liability be characterized in the same terms as
the profit realized on the sale of the stock, namely as a long-term capital
transaction. Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973).
The significance of the decision in Anderson is that, for the first time,
the courts have adopted a precise test for determining the tax status of
payments made in satisfaction of section 16(b) liability-a test which is
4. A "long-term capital gain" is any gain resulting from the "sale or ex-
change of a capital asset held for more than 6 months, if and to the extent such
gain is taken into account in computing gross income." 26 U.S.C. § 1222(3)
(1970). "In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, if for any taxable
year the net long-term capital gain exceeds the net short-term capital loss, 50 per-
cent of the amount of such excess shall be a deduction from gross income .
26 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970).
5. "In general. There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business...." 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (1970).
6. A "long-term capital loss" is incurred "from the sale or exchange of a
capital asset held for more than 6 months, if and to the extent such loss is taken
into account in computing taxable income." 26 U.S.C. § 1222(4) (1970).
In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, losses from sales or
exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to the extent of the gains
from such sales or exchanges, plus (if such losses exceed such gains)
whichever of the following is smallest:
(A) the taxable income for the taxable year.
(B) $1,000, or
(C) the sum of-
(i) the excess of the net short-term capital loss over the net long-
term capital gain, and
(ii) one-half of the excess of the net long-term capital loss over the
net short-term capital gain.
26 U.S.C. § 1211(b)(1) (1970).
7. James E. Anderson, 56 T.C. 1370 (1971).
8. 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
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both equitable and consistent with the notion of strict liability implicit in
section 16(b). In so doing, the Seventh Circuit took a major step toward
resolving this long-standing conflict between the Internal Revenue Code
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, without frustrating the purpose
of either.
The purpose of this note is, therefore, to reexamine this conflict, and
to assess what impact the Anderson decision may have upon its eventual
resolution in the Supreme Court.
In attempting to resolve the tax questions associated with payments
made by corporate insiders 9 in satisfaction of section 16(b) liability,
the courts were initially faced with the issue of whether any deduction
against ordinary income in the year of the payment should be allowed.
In William F. Davis, Jr.,10 the first case to examine the issue, the deduc-
tion was.denied.
Davis, a director of United Drug, Inc., sold 1,000 shares of United
Drug stock for $25,441.50. Within six months he purchased 2,000 shares
of United Drug, thereby incurring liability to the company under section
16(b). 11 Davis then paid $12,659.00 to the corporation, the difference
between the proceeds from the sale and the cost of 1,000 of the 2,000
shares he later purchased,' 2 and subsequently claimed a federal income
tax deduction equal to the entire amount of the repayment.' 3
The Commissioner disallowed the deduction contending that section
9. Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines an insider as:
"[e]very person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10
per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security)
which is registered pursuant to section 12 of this title, or who is a director or an
officer of the issuer of such security ...... 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
10. 17 T.C. 549 (1951).
11. Liability under section 16(b) is incurred when an insider, in this case a
director, sells and then subsequently repurchases within six months, securities of the
company with which he is employed.
12. 17 T.C. at 554.
13. Davis' claim for deduction was based on section 23(a)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, now section 162(a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code,
which allows a deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. .. "
26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (1970). It has long been judicially recognized that an in-
dividual, when acting as an employee, officer, or director of a corporation, is en-
gaged in a trade or business, separate from that of the corporation within the
meaning of section 162(a). Hochschild v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 817 (2d Cir.
1947), rev'g 7 T.C. 81 (1946); Joseph P. Pike, 44 T.C. 787 (1965); William L.
Butler, 17 T.C. 675 (1951). Each of the taxpayers in the Hochschild, Butler, and
Pike cases, was engaged in the business of being an officer and/or director of a
corporation; each made payments to his corporation by reason of an apparent breach
of a fiduciary duty and/or to protect his business reputation; and in each case, the
payment in question was held to be deductible as a business expense.
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16(b) liability was in the nature of a penalty.1 4 The Tax Court affirmed,
stating that allowance of the deduction, "would weaken an effective
method of enforcing the sharply defined policy expressed in section 16(b).
"15
Shortly after Davis, the United States Supreme Court decided Arrow-
smith v. Commissioner.' The taxpayers in Arrowsmith had received dis-
tributions in complete liquidation of a corporation in which they were the
sole shareholders, which they subsequently claimed as long-term capital
gains. In a later year, after being required as transferees of the liqui-
dated corporation's assets to pay a judgment rendered against the cor-
poration, they attempted to treat the payment as an ordinary business
loss. Stating that characterization of the deduction as a business loss
rather than a capital loss would result in a much larger deduction, the
Court held the loss was capital, saying:
I.R.C., § 23(g) 18 treats losses from exchanges of capital assets as "capital
losses" and I.R.C., § 115(c) 19 requires that liquidation distributions be
treated as exchanges. The losses here fall squarely within the definition
of "capital losses" contained in these sections. Taxpayers were required
to pay the judgment because of the liability imposed on them as transferees
of liquidation distribution assets. And it is plain that their liability as
transferees was not based on any ordinary business transaction of theirs
apart from the liquidation proceedings. 17
Although the court in Arrowsmith did not address itself directly to tax
questions associated with section 16(b) liability, it clearly indicated that
if a transaction in the year in which the deduction is sought is integrally
related to a prior sale or exchange, then the subsequent transaction, for
tax purposes, will be characterized in terms of the prior transaction. In
other words, if a prior sale or exchange produced a profit taxable as a
long-term capital gain, and that sale or exchange was integrally related
to a subsequent transaction in which the taxpayer was required to repay
the profit, then the repayment of that profit would be deductible only
as a long-term capital loss.
14. In the leading case of Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943), the court held that "the statute was in-
tended to be thoroughgoing, to squeeze all possible profits out of stock transac-
tions, and thus to establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict between
the selfish interest of a fiduciary officer, director, or stockholder and the faithful
performance of his duty." Id. at 239.
15. 17 T.C. at 558.
16. 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
17. Id. at 8.
18. Now Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 1222, 26 U.S.C. § 1222 (1970).
19. Now Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 331(a)(1), 26 U.S.C. § 331(a)(1)
(1970).
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Following Arrowsmith, implicit in which were equitable considerations
prohibiting the manipulation of the tax laws to produce an unwarranted
tax advantage, the Internal Revenue Service found that in cases involving
section 16(b) liability, its policy of either allowing a deduction against
ordinary income, or denying deductibility altogether, often proved to be
unsatisfactory.20 As a result, in 1961, the Internal Revenue Service modi-
fied its earlier position by ruling that section 16(b) is not a penal provi-
sion. 2' According to the ruling, "[t]he purpose of the statute is to place
the insider in the same position he would have occupied if he had never
engaged in stock dealings."2 2  The insider was held entitled to a deduc-
tion in the amount of his payment in satisfaction of the section 16(b)
liability, since "the allowance of the deduction is consistent with the pur-
pose of the statute in returning the insider to his original position. ' 23
However, "[t]he income tax significance of the capital stock dealings
giving rise to the payment determines whether it is deductible as an or-
dinary loss or as a capital loss. ' '24
20. See Lokken, Tax Significance of Payments in Satisfaction of Liabilities
Arising Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 4 GA. L. REV.
298 (1970). The author provides the following example:
An insider, taxed at a fifty percent marginal rate, sells a share of the cor-
poration's stock, which has a basis of $10, for $20, recognizing a long-term
capital gain of $10. Within six months thereafter, he purchases another
share at $10. . . . He pays the resulting 16(b) profit of $10 to the cor-
poration. If the payment is deducted from ordinary income, the insider
apparently realizes a net profit from the offending transactions of $2.50.
The apparent profit increases if the insider is placed in a higher marginal
bracket. However, denial of the deduction will increase the ultimate cost
of the insider's encounter with section 16(b) to $12.50. Again, the net
cost will vary with the insider's marginal rate bracket. Neither result seems
fully consistent with the closely balanced sanction imposed by section
16(b). The enigma results, of course, because the gain on the sale is
taxed at the preferential capital gains rate. The apparent conflict with
section 16(b) can be resolved only by eliminating or offsetting that tax.
Id. at 304.
21. Rev. Rul. 61-115, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 46, 48. The rationale behind this
ruling appears to be that since 16(b) provides only a civil remedy to the corpora-
tion, it can be fairly inferred that criminal penalties are not necessary to accom-
plish the purposes of the section, thereby making the liability imposed non-penal.
In Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV.
L. REv. 385, 616 (1953), the authors argue that in some cases short-swing insider
trading may be justified, and that such trading would not violate the provision if
the insider did not benefit unfairly from inside information. Therefore, assuming
the temptation to profit unfairly would be effectively deterred by making the
transaction profitless, one could argue that a tax result which effects as ultimate
after-tax cost to the insider in excess of the profit recoverable by the corporation
would frustrate the purpose of section 16(b). Lokken, supra note 19, at 303.





In William L. Mitchell,25 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ar-
gued that Arrowsmith demanded that the character of the insiders' deduc-
tion be determined by the nature of the transactions from which the 16(b)
liability arose. Mitchell, a General Motors vice president, had reported
a long-term capital gain on the sale of General Motors stock in October
1962. In January 1963, he purchased additional General Motors stock.
The sale followed by the purchase within six months constituted a viola-
tion of section 16(b), the profit from which, computed as the excess of
his selling price of the shares in 1962 over his purchase price for the
same number of shares in 1963, Mitchell agreed to repay to General Mo-
tors.
In reaching its decision, the Tax Court construed Arrowsmith as requir-
ing an integral relation between the transaction in one year and the trans-
action in another. 26 However, the court rejected the Commissioner's ar-
gument that Arrowsmith required the deduction to be characterized as a
capital loss, holding that the crux of Arrowsmith was not the favorable
tax treatment in the earlier year, but rather the relationship between the
prior years' liquidation and the later repayment. Since the court felt this
relationship was lacking in Mitchell,27 deduction of the full amount of
the payment was allowed as an ordinary and necessary business expense.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court 28 on the basis of
25. 52 T.C. 170 (1969).
26. In sum, it appears to us that the underlying element in the Arrow-
smith line of case law is the existence of an integral relationship between
two taxable transactions in separate years, so that the characterization of
the latter transaction by the earlier one is necessary in order to reflect the
true taxable income of the taxpayer. Only by such reasoning does the
logic of those decisions become evident.
52 T.C. at 175.
27. In the instant case in 1962, when petitioner sold General Motors
stock, he reported a long-term capital gain and paid the resulting tax. That
gain was then his property without a claim against it on the part of
anyone. It was a completed transaction. In 1963, petitioner purchased
other shares of General Motors common stock at a price fixed by stock
options owned by him. Upon this latter transaction, nothing of tax con-
sequence took place. Only upon the sale or disposition of the purchased
stock could it be said that anything with tax incidence had occurred.
[citations omitted.] Because the purchase of the stock in 1963 took place
within 6 months of the sale transaction, however, an entirely separate and
distinct statute from the Internal Revenue Code was alleged to have come
into operation, i.e., section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Violation of section 16(b) has no ipso facto tax effect whatsoever but
merely creates an indebtedness between an "insider" officer of a corpora-
tion and his corporate employer.
52 T.C. at 174.
28. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'g 52 T.C. 170
(1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971).
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United States v. Skelly Oil Co.,20 decided by the United States Supreme
Court nine days after the Tax Court decision in Mitchell.
In Skelly Oil, the corporation was required to repay income which
had been taxed after a 27.5 percent oil depletion allowance.30 After the
Commissioner had disallowed a deduction for the full amount of the re-
payment as an ordinary and necessary business expense, the Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that Skelly Oil was limited in the year of repay-
ment to a deduction for the amount repaid reduced by the percentage
depletion attributed to the receipt of that amount in the earlier years.
In so deciding, the Court found that permitting a deduction for the full
amount of the repayment would be tantamount to allowing a double
deduction, a result precluded by Arrowsmith. Writing for the majority,
Mr. Justice Marshall explained:
The rationale for the Arrowsmith rule is easy to see; if money was taxed
at special lower rate when received, the taxpayer would be accorded an
unfair tax windfall if repayments were generally deductible from receipts
taxable at the higher rate applicable to ordinary income. The Court in
Arrowsmith was unwilling to infer that Congress intended such a result.3 1
In citing Mr. Justice Marshall's opinion,3 2 it is clear that the Sixth Cir-
cuit adopts the Skelly Oil interpretation of the Arrowsmith decision; spe-
cifically, that if allowing a deduction for the full amount of the repayment
would have the practical effect of allowing the taxpayer a double deduc-
tion, and, therefore, an unfair tax windfall, then Arrowsmith requires that
the repayment be deducted at the lower rate-the rate at which the
income was originally taxed.
In addition to adopting the double deduction theory as the test to deter-
mine whether the Arrowsmith rule applies, the Sixth Circuit expressly
rejected the Tax Court position of allowing ordinary business deductions
when the payments were made to protect the taxpayer's employment
and business reputation,3 as well as implicitly rejecting the Tax Court
29. 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
30. In 1958, Skelly Oil was required to refund to customers $505,536 in over-
charges collected in the previous six years. In its tax returns for those years, the
corporation had included annual sums going to make up the $505,536 in its "gross
income from the property" which section 613 of the Code makes the basis for the
27.5% depletion allowed for the production of oil and natural gas. As a result of
the depletion allowance, therefore, the actual increase in taxable income was
$366,513. However, in its 1958 tax return, the corporation attempted to deduct the
$505,536 it was forced to return as an ordinary and necessary business expense under
section 162 of the Code. United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
The Code has since been amended to allow a 22% depletion. 26 U.S.C. § 613(b)
(1) (1970).
31. 394 U.S. at 685.
32. 428 F.2d at 263.
33. Id.
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decision in Mitchell, which held that the crux of Arrowsmith was the in-
tegral relation theory. 34
Despite the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Mitchell, the Tax Court, in
James E. Anderson,5 adhered to its original position that payments in
satisfaction of section 16(b) liability were deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses.3 6 While maintaining its position that Ar-
rowsmith does not apply because a sale and repurchase are separate trans-
actions involving only securities law significance, and, therefore, no inte-
gral relation, the Tax Court went one step further in holding that there
was also no integral relation between the transactions because the sale
and purchase were made in taxpayer's capacity as a shareholder, while
the repayment was made in his capacity as an employee to protect his
employment and business reputation.3 7
As a result of the Tax Court decision in Anderson, the Seventh Circuit
was presented with three issues: First, whether the appropriate test for
determining the applicability of the Arrowsmith rule was the integral re-
lation theory38 advanced by the Tax Court, or the double deduction the-
ory39 set forth by the Supreme Court in Skelly Oil; second, given the ap-
propriate test, whether the Arrowsmith rule does, in fact, apply; and
third, whether the taxpayer's capacity in making the payment is of any
significance in determining its tax status.
. Although the court does not address itself directly to the first issue,
it is nevertheless clear from the majority opinion-"that Arrowsmith, with
and without the benefit of its interpretation in Skelly Oil, is applicable to
this case . . ."40 -that Anderson represents a significant departure from
the rationale of the Skelly Oil line of case law which supports the double
deduction theory. Consequently, if an integral relation exists between a
prior sale and a subsequent payment, it may be fairly inferred that Ar-
rowsmith will apply, irrespective of whether a double deduction will result.
. Despite the failure of the court to stress the appropriateness of the in-
tegral relation theory, there has been support for this position in recent
case law4' and commentary. 42  In fact, only in viewing Arrowsmith as
34. 52 T.C. at 175.
35. 56T.C. 1370 (1971).
36. The Tax Court has reaffirmed its reasoning in this case in Nathan Cum-
mings, 60 T.C. No. 11 (April 23, 1973).
37. 56 T.C. at 1374-76.
38. See note 26 and accompanying text, supra.
39. See note 31 and accompanying text, supra.
40. Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 1307 (7th Cir. 1973).
41. See Arthur H. DuGrenier, Inc., 58 T.C. 931 (1972); Reese Blow Pipe Mfg.
Co., 41 T.C. 598 (1964); Estate of James M. Shannonhouse, 21 T.C. 422 (1953);
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requiring an integral relation between the prior sale and the subsequent
payment can a result be obtained that is consistent with the notion of
strict liability implicit in section 16(b).43
An illustration of this position is demonstrated in the situation of an
insider taxpayer who incurs both a capital loss and section 16(b) liability
as a result of a purchase-sale transaction. Suppose, for example, a tax-
payer purchased 100 shares of X Corporation ten years ago for $5,000.
If, in the current year, he purchases another 100 shares for $4,000, fol-
lowed by a sale for $4,600, within six months, of the shares purchased
ten years ago, the result will be a $400 long-term capital loss on the sale
for tax purposes, as well as a section 16(b) gain and liability of $600.
Regardless of what his basis had been for tax purposes, his section 16(b)
liability would still be $600. 44  Clearly, then, the absence of any con-
nection between the amount of tax gain or loss and the amount of the
section 16(b) liability is irrelevant.
Given this situation, in which a loss on the sale for tax purposes pre-
cludes a section 1202 deduction, the allowance of an ordinary loss for
the amount paid in satisfaction of the section 16(b) liability would not
produce a double deduction, and, therefore, the rationale of Skelly Oil
would not require capital loss treatment. However, despite the absence
of any double deduction, Arrowsmith should apply to produce a capital
loss because of the integral relation between the liability and the sale.
Assuming, however, that a particular sale-payment transaction does
give rise to a double deduction, it is not clear that even the Skelly Oil
interpretation of Arrowsmith would require capital loss treatment. Writ-
ing for the majority in Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner,45 Mr. Justice Doug-
las stated:
see also Estate of Bessie E. Machris, 34 T.C. 827 (1960).
42. See Darrell, The Tax Treatment of Payments Under Section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 64 H.div. L. REv. 80 (1950); Lokken, note 20,
supra.
43. See Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 992 (1971).
In order to achieve its goals, Congress chose a relatively arbitrary rule
capable of easy administration. The objective standard of 16(b) imposes
strict liability upon substantially all transactions occurring within the statu-
tory time period, regardless of the intent of the insider or the existence of
actual speculation. This rule maximized the ability of the rule to eradicate
speculative abuses by reducing difficulties in proof.
Id. at 696. See also 2 L. Loss, SEcURrrns REGULATION 1043 (1961).
44. See Rabinovitz, Effect of Prior Year's Transactions on Federal Income Tax
Consequences of Current Receipts or Payments, 28 TAx L. Rav. 85, 106 (1972).
45. 349 U.S. 237 (1955).
46. Id. at 240.
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[Tihe rule that general equitable considerations do not control the measure
of deductions or tax benefits cuts both ways. It is as applicable to the
Government as to the taxpayer. Congress may be strict or lavish in its
allowance of deductions or tax benefits. The formula it writes may be ar-
bitrary and harsh in its applications. But where the benefit claimed by
the taxpayer is fairly within the statutory language and the construction
sought is in harmony with the statute as an organic whole, the benefits
will not be withheld from the taxpayer though they represent an unexpected
windfall. 46
In a dissenting opinion in Skelly Oil, Mr. Justice Stewart concurred with
the majority in Lewyt, and correctly indicated that
[iun prior decisions disallowing what truly were "double deductions," the
Court has relied on evident statutory indications, not just its own view of
the equities, that Congress intended to preclude the second deduction. In
those cases the taxpayers sought to benefit twice from the same statute
deduction. In this case, by contrast, the respondent has taken two different
deductions accorded by Congress for distinct purposes. .... 47
Accepting the integral relation theory as the appropriate test for ap-
plication of the Arrowsmith rule, the question then becomes whether such
a relation, in fact exists. The Tax Court, in both Mitchell and Ander-
son, repeatedly emphasized that the sale giving rise to the capital gain
was a closed transaction for tax purposes. And since the subsequent pur-
chase was without tax significance, the payment in satisfaction of section
16(b) liability was held to lack the requisite integral relation to the prior
sale.
In rejecting the Tax Court argument, the court relied implicitly on the
nature of the transactions involved and their relation to section 16(b).
Recognizing that both the sale and purchase were capital transactions,
which together gave rise to section 16(b) liability, the court found the
requisite integral relation to exist between the sale-purchase combination
and the subsequent payment.48
Logically, it appears that the characterization of the payment as an
adjustment on the sales price is correct. This is evidenced by the fact
that the amount of liability is calculated by substracting from the sales
proceeds the lowest purchase price within the six-month period,49 and that
interest on the payments may be required from the date of the sale pre-
ceding the purchase.8 0
Turning to the remaining issue of whether the capacity of the taxpayer
in making the sale-purchase and subsequent payment is significant in
47. 394 U.S. at 695-96.
48. Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973).
49. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 50-52 (2d Cir. 1951).
50. B.T. Babbit, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1964).
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determining the type of deduction allowed, it is clear that the court cor-
rectly rejected this distinction as unpersuasive. 51 One merely has to look
to the language of the Securities Act to discover that section 16(b) was in-
tended to regulate the activities of officers, directors, and shareholders
owning 10% or more of the company's stock. 2 To argue, therefore, that
a sale-purchase made in the taxpayer's shareholder capacity, and a sub-
sequent payment made as an employee to protect his business reputation
warrants special tax treatment, clearly places the non-employee share-
holder at a disadvantage not contemplated by the statute.
In resolving this issue, the court indicated that it would be more appro-
priate to view the taxpayer as an insider-the capacity in which he made
the sale, purchase, and payment. However, even if the Tax Court's ca-
pacity distinction was prompted by the taxpayer's desire to protect his
employee status, "nothing in Arrowsmith or Skelly Oil suggests that the
purpose of the taxpayer in satisfying the demand must be rooted in the
exclusively identical capacity in which the profit was realized and the
demand was made."153
In conclusion, it appears that the court's decision in the instant case
accomplished two things: First, in adopting the integral relation theory
as the sole test for interpreting the applicability of the Arrowsmith rule,
the court has sanctioned a standard for determining the tax status of
insider payments that clarifies an otherwise controversial area of the
law; and second, it adheres to the notion of strict liability implicit in sec-
tion 16(b) without frustrating the policy underlying the Internal Revenue
Code. As a result, the court has eliminated a significant loophole in the
tax law through which corporate insiders have effectively managed to
avoid the full extent of the liability imposed by section 16(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.
John Bilanko
51. See James E. Anderson, 56 T.C. 1370, 1374-75 (1971), for a more com-
plete discussion of this issue.
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
53. Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 1308 (7th Cir. 1973).
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